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The Electoral Campaign on
Television
Communication Strategies and Models of Democracy
Florence Brisset-Foucault
1 Since the 2002 alternation, the audiovisual sector in Kenya experienced an impressive
expansion resulting from political liberalization and economic growth. The vitality of
publicity and the presence of a vibrant middle class gave the Kenyan media sector a
specific  status on the continent.  Television viewers had eight  local  channels  at  their
disposal,  which ran a mixture of  English and Swahili  programmes,  a regional  station
based in Tanzania (East Africa TV, which is largely music-based), cable and satellite TV, as
well as American and British (CNN, BBC) news broadcasts. The two stations attracting the
largest audiences are Nation TV (NTV) and Kenya Television Network (KTN).1 These are
followed by Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC, the public network) and Citizen TV,
owned by Samuel Macharia, a close friend of Mwai Kibaki.2 
2 The 2007 electoral campaign was held under tense conditions. There was some violence,
and generally, fears concerning the reaction of the defeated candidate punctuated public
debate with increasing anxiety. In other respects, in their mobilization speeches, some
candidates resorted to an ethnic tone. Despite all this, through television broadcasts, the
campaign could appear to be a model, feeding the image of “the continent’s window into
democracy,” that liked to highlight Kenyans and the idea of “normalcy” or of a “democratic
routine” of a country in alternation.
3 The weeks before the elections experienced exponential growth in political programming
on both TV and radio, with the setting up of political analysis editorial meetings, daily
reports  of  the  different  political  meetings  on  news  programmes  (almost  completely
focusing on the campaigns) and an impressive mobilization of news features, particularly
on voting day with the deployment of a network of correspondents in all voting stations
throughout the country.
4 The season also came with a flurry of political shows interviewing Kenyan citizens by
telephone,  text  messages  (SMS)3,  and  also  directly  in  the  studios.  These  broadcasts,
having  attained  growing  visibility  on  Kenyan  television,  especially  since  the
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constitutional referendum of 2005, acquired a legitimate dimension. Bearing witness to
this are the resultant polemics on the holding of a live debate between the three main
presidential candidates. A show titled ‘The Grand Rumble’ was to be broadcast by the
private channel KTN, in partnership with BBC on 12 December, Jamhuri Day. Raila Odinga
declared his willingness to participate and in a press conference held on 10 December, he
publicly challenged Mwai Kibaki to participate. The latter has traditionally been rather
reticent in the media. Due to the media’s growing influence, different strategies emerged
within Kenyan politics—Raila Odinga attempted to subvert the structure by imposing new
rules of political communication. He persisted in a credible argument, presenting the
outgoing president as belonging to a bygone political era, considering that M. Kibaki did
not  want  to  submit  to  a  “public  examination".4 Eventually,  Raila  also  declined  the
invitation to the debate, saying that it would not be worthwhile to only face Kalonzo
Musyoka, the “third man” in the election. In the end, the debate was cancelled.
5 Despite the 2007 election having displayed an impressive use of political communication
strategies,5 one must reckon with difficult trends which have existed since 2002, with the
major  stage  being  the  referendum  campaign  of  2005.  This  latter  experienced  a
mobilisation of media owners, who organised two editions of an interactive talk-show
aimed at clarifying the stakes of the constitutional reform. This show, The Big Debate,
produced by the Media Owners Association (MOA), was simultaneously broadcast on all
Kenyan TV channels. It was a means for journalist to publicly display their impartiality in
a situation where they had been heavily criticized.6 The talk-show was also an important
precedent in the structuring of a political communication sphere and the expertise of
certain journalists (Julie Gichuru, Louis Otieno, Wachira Waruru…) in the production and
presentation of this type of broadcast.
6 Three shows will be discussed in detail here—Debate 07, screened on KTN, Agenda Kenya on
NTV, and Citizen TV’s Louis Otieno Live on the Road. These shows were viewed from the
studios of the TV stations during fieldwork carried out in December 2007, in the four
weeks preceding the elections. The programmes were chosen due to their popularity and
were aired at peak hours, thus capturing large audiences. The three also had different
profiles, with two shows being sponsored by characteristically different NGOs. Louis Otieno
… was sponsored by a Dutch foundation, Media Focus on Africa while Agenda Kenya was
funded by Medeva, a Kenyan NGO. Debate 07 was aired during the campaign period while
Louis Otieno.was a mobile show, going across the eight provinces of Kenya. These were
weekly programmes, lasting between 40 to 90 minutes. They were mostly in English, but
contributions in Kiswahili also abounded. The shows were built around four or five guest
speakers in a forum, before a public of 15 to 150 persons, depending on the show. A
moderator led the discussions.
7 The viewing of these shows led to an interrogation of the political models presented and
promoted  on  Kenyan  TV.  Which  of  these  would  fade  away  to  different  citizenship,
leadership and national  community models? How would the limits of  what would be
termed unspeakable be defined in the public arena? Before an analysis of these models,
one must consider the most autonomous sphere of political communication in Kenya,
encompassing journalists, politicians, academics, NGOs and international donors. Indeed,
these broadcasts were the result of a voluntary collaboration between these different
actors, all involved in the electoral campaign. The idea was then to submit these models
to  discussions  and  to  public  profiles  in  order  to  position  and  analyse  the  ideal  of
citizenship projected in these shows.
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Political communication in Kenya: professionalisation,
extroversion and autonomy
8 The “field” according to Bourdieu supposes a much more precise limitation than what
currently characterises political communication in Kenya. However, it is a useful notion
as it allows an understanding the dynamics of how reproduction stakes and autonomy are
created in related fields: academic, journalistic, political and development.7 The idea is
therefore to show how a professional and political communication sector is structured in
Kenya. What position does it take and what are the strength relationships within it? How
does each of these actors attempt to preserve their autonomy or to dominate the others
in order to pursue their own economic interests and to impose a specific interpretation of
the political situation?8
 
The spread of international models and donor involvement
9 Extroversion  plays  an  important  role  in  the  accumulation  of  symbolic  and  financial
capital required for a restructuring of the political communication sector.  It  allows a
spread of media models from the North, circulates funding and personnel, and modifies
strength relationships on the ground.
 
Strong presence of NGOs and international donors
10 The works of Nicolas Guilhot on the influence of the principal social science foundations
are clear on the analysis of relationships between fund donors and the African media.
According to N. Guilhot, donors must “impose principles conforming to specific interests under
an  objective  and  universal  form”9 as  universal  training  principles  for  the  ruling  elite.
Journalism, with its “universal” rules of a professional code of ethics and impartiality
principles—particularly in election periods—and thus its appearance of “objectivity” free
from ideology, is in this sense a good base for symbolic exportation.
11 According to Dezalay and Garth, “structural homology” between the North and the South,
and the success of symbolic import—export10 is visible in Kenya through a meeting of the
activities of the high priests of good governance and the values that Kenyan mainstream
journalists  would  like  to  incarnate  within  their  political  space  (partisan  neutrality,
detribalisation and moralisation of  political  life,  denouncing corruption,  political  and
economic  liberalism).  Furthermore,  journalists  embody  a  consensual  ideal  of
democratisation.  These factors  partly explain the access  of  the Kenyan media to the
NGOs. The meeting between converging economic interests explains the rest.
12 Some of the most popular talk-shows are sponsored by NGOs that specialise in media
production.11 This  sponsorship  takes  several  forms:  the  delivery  of  a  complete  TV
programme to a station, with the production having been completed by the NGO (the
filming is done outside the station, the guest speakers and public chosen by the NGO, the
costs covered, and programme moderated not by a journalist but by an employee of the
NGO). This was the case with Agenda Kenya, produced by Medeva, an NGO agitating for a
greater allocation of local programmes in the media schedules. Medeva is headed by two
British former journalists of  the BBC.  It  is  funded by the Ford Foundation,  the Open
Society Institute, the German Cooperation and also receives funds from advertising.
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13 The  second  option  is  what  can  be  referred  to  as  “vampirisation” of  a pre-existing
broadcast,  generally  one  that  had  high  popularity.  This  is  true  for  Louis  Otieno  Live,
sponsored between October  and December by the Dutch Foundation Media  Focus  on
Africa, mostly from the UNDP “elections” fund. Media Focus paid Citizen TV Ksh 1 million
(€ 10,000) per broadcast, to cover the costs of production, and used the programme as a
tool for civic education. The NGO also modified some formal aspects of the programme.
This sponsorship actually made if possible for Louis Otieno Live to go on the road to eight
Kenyan  provinces,  with  local  residents  and  civil  society  protagonists  as  the  studio
audience and forum speakers. This case in particular caused conflict between the NGO
and the journalists who wanted to maintain a level of editorial autonomy.
14 Several issues should be emphasized in an analysis of sponsored television broadcasts. If
it is to be captured in a global dependence framework, the example of the Kenyan media
demands that to a certain extent, the idea of unilateral dependence and an understanding
of the unequal strength between donors from the North and the African media, be put
into perspective, particularly in an electoral period. Indeed, for an NGO like Media Focus,
at this particular moment all stakes were to position itself as an undeniable actor in the
political  debate,  with  influence  on  defining  the  discussions  and  the  agenda.  This
immediately justified the monies it received from UNDP and from their other donors but
equally conferred some credibility on the media and experts that they sought to attract.
The organisation had to position itself in a competitive electoral education field. Some
journalists  have understood this  very well  as  they play off  this  competitiveness  and
dependence on NGOs.12 In the electoral context, the market becomes more competitive as
new actors emerge and as special funds are released by donors. One must also take into
account the good economic health of the media in Kenya13 (this differs from other African
countries where the media can develop a great dependence on financial donors). These
NGOs, whose success in creating projects is partially based on the inequalities of power
relationships with local actors, find themselves in a more difficult position in Kenya than
elsewhere on the continent.
15 This  loss  of  editorial  autonomy  resulting  from  fully-loaded  programmes  produced
externally,  if  true, must furthermore be routinely replaced in the African audiovisual
sector, which imports a huge amount of foreign programmes (from South American soap
operas to German cultural broadcasts, BBC and VOA newsflashes…).
16 Moreover, in the British audiovisual scene, more so in the French journalistic tradition,
TV and radio programmes are often produced commercially,  and then bought by the
stations. A case in point is Question Time on the BBC, produced by Mentorn, from which
Agenda Kenya drew inspiration. This context explains the autonomy given to Medeva by
NTV.
17 Despite this, a form of dependence exists: the Kenyan media seek scheduling and local
programming.14 They  also  need  editorial  innovation  which  allows  them  to  remain
competitive although they may not necessarily have the means. These types of broadcast
define the identity of the station, place the media as undeniable actors in the political
debate and allow them to put forward an “impartiality”—this is key in a station like
Citizen, whose covering of the campaign was highly favourable to the outgoing president.
Turning to NGOs to fund this type of “product” represents an important choice in terms
of image and autonomy, since this allows them to be independent of patronage from
politicians and large commercial entreprises15. The struggle for editorial autonomy led by
some journalists against these donors must be taken into account following a broader
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analysis on issues of management and dependence. The idea for these actors is to attract
donors from the North while demonstrating a need and affirming their autonomy at the
same time.
18 The contract  between Media  Focus  and Citizen TV was  based on a  “shared editorial
control” clause. The sharing of tasks was thus carried out from day to day between the
two organizations, which created conflict between the donor and the station until the
contract was ended.16 Media Focus, in accordance with its objectives and those of the
UNDP, sought to put forward some values (partisan equilibrium, room for consultants)
and certain themes (leadership, corruption, youth, gender), through pre-defined topics
and guests. This interference was not appreciated by some journalists at Citizen, who
went  on  to  question  the  relevance  of  the  choices  made  by  Media  Focus.17 The
disagreements were mainly on the amount of time to allot debates in the different places
visited. Faced with an NGO that had predefined certain themes (gender, youth etc.), the
journalists wanted subjects that were appropriate to the local needs, while giving each
debate the value of national representation. As explained by a journalist from Citizen TV:
Sometimes  we are  asked to  do  these  things.  ‘Go  to  Embu  and  talk  about  women’s
problems.’ That never works! In Nyeri they would like us to speak only about the
youth. You know, you can never go there and say that you would like to focus on
the youth and politics. Then, we have to change some aspects. (…) In the first place,
this programme has never been done before in the country. People want to talk;
they want to say what their problems are. You can’t go to a place and tell them ‘This
is what we would like you to talk about.’ Then the people will tell you: ‘We also have
problems concerning A, B, C, D.’  You cannot go to an area where there is no show,
where you can say: ‘Ok, today, we were in Nyeri, where we spoke to the youth, yesterday
we spoke about women so today, we will talk about schoolteachers, tomorrow we will talk
about farmers!’18
19 There were other conflicts that occurred, on the issue of invited speakers. An example is
when the NGO invited Maina Kiai, chairman of the Kenya Human Rights Commission,
particularly  visible  during  the  electoral  campaign  and  highly  critical  of  the  Kibaki
administration. The station was opposed to this, officially giving the reason that he was
not on the list of expected speakers.19 In order to negotiate their editorial autonomy, the
journalists fell back on the excuse of poor knowledge of the field and the expectations of
Kenya viewers and on the argument of Media Focus’ uselessness, as a “go-between” or
“facilitator.” The journalists sometimes went as far as to directly consult with UNDP.
20 However, some teams, such as that of Debate 07 on KTN, explicitly refused sponsorship
despite offers that came their way. In the same manner, Hannington Gaya, the director of
the Media Owners Association, refused to organise joint shows on all TV stations as had
been the case in 2005 campaign:
This time around, I was very uneasy (…), I did not have the impression that it would
be honest because some sponsoring bodies imposed rules: ‘We would this like person
to emcee the debate; we would like him to be like this.’ (…) For example, the Republican
Institute wanted only economic issues to be raised. For me, this meant that they
wanted a pro-Kibaki campaign. Or: ‘We would like so-and-so and so-and-so in the forum.’
(…) They wanted to invite CEOs to ask the questions (…) gave me names of people to
put in the forum.20
 
Spread and development of Western media models
21 The Kenyan media are often influenced by Anglo-Saxon journalism models,21 at the level
of separation between the “facts” and the “commentaries,” the format of the shows, the
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daily news, and even jingles. The one of Citizen TV (This is Citizen) immediately draws
images of CNN (This is CNN)… According to their designers, all political shows are inspired
by British  or  American programmes.  Examples  are  Debate  07 and Agenda  Kenya.  This
former is the home-grown reply to the BBC’s famous Question Time, which has been in
existence since 1974 and practically became an institution in Great Britain. Debate 07 was
created in September 2007 during the campaign period. It was presented by Linus Kaikai,
a  star  presenter  who aimed to reproduce the model  of  American electoral  debates—
initiated in the 1960s with the famous Nixon-Kennedy debate—which was not possible
due to Kibaki’s refusal to participate. Kaikai says that he is today inspired by the debates
launched by CNN in partnership with YouTube.
22 It is worth noting that several presenters considering this type of debate as new in Kenya,
claimed  to  be  the  source  of  this  innovation,  giving  it  an  avant-garde  role.22 More
interestingly,  it  can  be  seen  that  in  the  journalists’  discussions,  justification  of  this
importation  operates  under  the  title  of  “democratic  normalcy”:  Kenya,  “a  new
democracy” opens up to media forms and “models” of democratic governance already in
vogue in countries of the North. The challenge is thus on the image of Kenya and of
Africa, that these journalists seek to portray. These broadcasts are in fact writings on the
electoral campaign and the transition, an attempt to project an image of Kenya that is a
“democratic window” of Africa (in a sort of nationalist enterprise), or an Africa where
democracy  is  “normalised.”23 For  the  journalists,  it  was a  chance  to  display  their
“professionalism” and their public political power, to Kenyan politics and at international
level.  The  fascination  for  the  American  media  and  more  so  during  the  elections  (a
reinforced effect  by the parallel  electoral  agenda between the two countries),  results
from the feeling that the media “make” the election, especially through the contradictory
debates between the candidates.24
23 Also  to  be  examined  are  the  importation  phenomena  through  the  careers  of  the
journalists. The “importers” are actually deeply integrated in the media sphere, which
occupies a dominant position in the field. With a strongly international reach (as seen in
the studies done or by the awarding of prizes such as the BBC Africa Award etc.), they
represent a model of success and of professional legitimacy. The prizes are especially
valuable,  if  they are considered from the extroversion point of view of Jean-François
Bayart,25 since they are reinvested in a particularly profitable manner within the country.
24 Finally, the remarkable presence of Western experts or “White wizards” as expressed by
Vincent  Hugeux,26 must  be  noted.  Among  these  is  the  famous  Dick  Morris,  former
campaign manager and close ally of Bill Clinton, who “offered” his services to R. Odinga.27
Three weeks before the election, M. Kibaki also deferred to a foreign consultant, Marcus
Courage, a Briton who had previously worked for him in 2002.28
 
The Kenyan arena and political communication: professionalism
and overlapping
Consultants
25 Despite the highly visible side of these foreign “spin doctors,” there is an establishment of
indigenous sector of political consultants with a growing recourse to journalists, NGOs,
politicians and experts, so that a programme or communication strategy can be designed
for a candidate or party;  to design campaign priorities  for the campaign of  an NGO,
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provide them with figures and analyses;  or  even to appear in the political  shows as
experts. A good illustration of the structure of a professional sector of experts during the
campaign period remains the think tank, “Kibaki Tekelezi” (Kibaki must complete the
work),29 partly constituted of Kenyan academics, which defined communication messages
and strategies for M. Kibaki. These academics thus had a direct influence on the form that
political shows on television would take, be in their own performance or through the
advice in communication that they provided to the politicians and to journalists.
26 This  convergence with the political  élite,  collaboration with the NGO world and this
visibility of university dons in the media reflects a specific strategy. Indeed, it allowed
some dons to acquire celebrity status and to emphasise their intellectual authority, to
spread  ideas,  justify  a  social  usefulness,  or  simply  to  emerge  from  economic
precariousness  and  thus  rationalize  an  academic  vocation.  Inequalities  in  the  world
academic scene, difficult work conditions and very low salaries enticed several African
academics to resort to consultancy, and not merely to propagate their ideas.
27 Although the example of these experts shows the interlocking between different fields,
the specialisation of some actors in this sort of activity and their growing professionalism
(creation of small consultancy companies, using most of their work hours doing this due
to  their  lucrative  nature)  equally  goes  into  autonomisation  and  harmonisation  of
professional practices linked to political communication and an indifference from the
actors of the Academy. In this sense, their appearance in talk-shows as experts is used as
a means to demonstrate their knowledge, their value and acquire visibility with the aim
of being employed by politicians. At this level, rather than demonstrations of loyalty, it is
value-added impartiality that seems of greater impact in the consultant market. It allows
them to keep their options open and to reinforce the argument of their authority and
credibility, which is highly sought after by the politicians.30
28 Whereas the phenomenon of Kenyan spin doctors demands a more profound sociological
analysis, two phenomena seemed interesting in relation to the profile of those that were
interviewed—studies or foreign academic sojourns, long-term political vocation (this also
shows the intermingling of politics/academia at the career level).
29 Another trend is the increase in the use of social sciences by politicians, through the use
of various forms of expertise, notably demographics, in the constituencies. Finally, the
“direct”  use  of  researchers  in  the  campaign  trail,  in  relaying  local  opinion  is  quite
fashionable.  For  the  politicians,  intellectual  authority  of  the  dons,  their  status  as
“national” figures due to their repeated appearance on TV, are good tools as they bring
credibility to the programme and to the candidate.
 
Strategies of political communication
30 Beyond the recruitment of experts, political parties and candidates used several other
communication tools during the campaign period.31 This was particularly the case for
ODM,  which  had  to  compensate  the  shortcomings  of  their  mobilisation  by  PNU,  of
resources and publics spaces (posters on public buildings etc.). It is in the media that ODM
was  seen  and  could  benefit  from  equal  airtime  and  speech  in  comparison  to  the
presidential camp.
31 There was also the habitual use of posters, newspaper advertisements and even the use of
cartoons. In 2007, there was also a flourishing use of SMS and spam (already having been
used  widely  in  2002  and  2005)  and  additionally,  calls  on  personal  telephones:  upon
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answering, the voter would find either R. Odinga or M. Kibaki on the other end. In reality,
this was a voice recording of the candidate stating his campaign promises.32
32 Some politicians have also capitalised on the corruption of journalists.33 The government
media, KBC and also those close to the authorities, for example Citizen TV, were placed
under the influence of PNU, thus slanting the format of talk-shows, especially in the
choice  of  invited  guests.  In  2005,  the  first  edition  of  The  Big  Debate34 was  harshly
criticised by several observers: presented by Rose Kimotho, director of Radio Kameme
and an ally of M. Kibaki, she was clearly in the pro-Banana camp. In 2007, during the talk-
shows broadcast  by  private  stations,  pressure  from the  government  was  less  visible.
Nevertheless, the difficulties experienced by M. Kiai in appearing on the guest forum of
Louis Otieno Live… gives an indication of the degree of pressure that could be weighed on
the media during the campaign.35
33 The large presence of journalists in the campaign teams should be noted; they were often
hired as experts in political communication just like the university dons, but also as press
attachés. M. Kibaki, for example, turned to the services of the former CEO of the Nation
34 Media Group, Wilfred Kiboro.36 But it  is ODM that took up several journalists,  having
characteristically taken a relatively important place in the field but also having had a
taste of disillusionment in the 2002 changes, especially in litigation cases such as David
Makali, former Managing Editor of The Standard.
35 Concerning talk-shows, it  is worth observing that in the case of Louis Otieno Live.  the
venue of a show in a region became a political stake, especially for the parliamentary
candidates, but also in the civic elections (many candidates in the civic elections were
part of the audience). The edition of Louis Otieno Live. in Narok was quite remarkable in
this sense: some candidates who were not invited by the producers spontaneously showed
up to be part of the forum. The symbolic resources that the candidates hoped to get from
these broadcasts were major—television is supposed to confer credibility and political
weight,  as well as surpassing one’s local ambitions, as it is a medium with a rational
reach.
 
Professionalisation of the public in talk-shows
36 Another  interesting  phenomenon in  the  analysis  of  structuring  the  field  of  political
communication in Kenya is the professionalisation of the actors present in audience of
these shows. Some activists from different political parties were specifically “mandated”
by the Secretariat to appear in the audience of the talk-shows, so that they would play the
role of party representatives. According to a PNU “representative,” there were about ten
of  them,37 chosen  by  the  head  of  communications  within  the  secretariat. 38 They
participated  in  several  talk-shows  during  the  campaign,  thus  providing  them  an
opportunity to fine-tune their skills in public speaking and to increase their own visibility
(some of these representatives were candidates in the civic elections).
37 This phenomenon is a means of recruiting members of the public by the producers of the
shows  and  is  not  limited  to  political  parties.  The  producers  specifically  assigned  to
“public mobilisation” often united in service research actually turned to a kind of indirect
mobilisation through associations,  political  parties,  and community groups,  that  they
contacted and charged with the task of providing audience members. There is thus a
wealth of choice to select from for representation in audiences. The control of the media
on  public  speech  is  therefore  relative,  as  the  filtration  process  is  done  by  these
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organisations. It is at this level that a “professionalisation” of the audience of talk-shows
is  done,  and  they  become  new “personalities”  in  political  communication,  acquiring
televisual skills and thus capital, which they can reinvest.39 Generally speaking, there was
a  huge  social  homogenity  in  the  audience  of  these  shows.  Out  of  about  40  people
interviewed on Louis Otieno Live… from 13 December in Nairobi, 20 were senior graduates
(universities,  colleges,  technical  institutes).  Among  the  others,  three  had  been  to
secondary school. 11 stated that they had no academic qualifications. The largest number,
33, claimed to belong to a political party or an association.40
38 The  televised  image  of  the  “ordinary  citizen”41 or  the  “common man”  thus  hides  a
complex selection process of the people seen in the studio, in which there is call  for
spontaneous candidates, party and association delegates and a network of interpersonal
knowledge of journalists.
39 Some shows were the direct choice of a representation. Where journalists were could be
clearly seen in the interviews, the public’s contribution was more ambiguous, as the value
added to the broadcast remained the idea of confrontation between the “leader” and the
“citizens.” As explained by L. Kaikai:
We specially  assigned tasks  [to  some members  of  the  audience],  to  ask  specific
questions. We had human rights, political reform, women’s issues, corruption. We
asked these people who had a background in the subject to ask these questions.
That  is  why  we  had  a  director  of  an  anti-corruption  NGO  to  ask  questions  on
corruption, we had a women’s leader who raised gender-based issues. (…) These
people represented something,  the majority of whom were recognizable as they
regularly appeared in the media. When a comment on corruption was needed, they
knew what to say and viewers were familiar with their faces. They were always
involved  in  public  debate.  This  was  an  opportunity  to  bring  together  both
candidates and “experts.”42
40 In a show like Debate 07, the producers wanted to create equality between the public and
the guest speakers. When R. Odinga came to the studio on 19 December, some of the
audience had even been coached by the KTN team.
41 In Crossfire, the Sunday radio talk-show of Kiss FM, the twenty or so people attending the
show are also mostly from the upper middle class, holding academic professions. Once
again, due to the mobilisation process of the public, who in this case were on the inter ‐
personal list but certainly also due to the show’s format, when a new “out-of-studio”
formula was required to “bring political debate to the people,” a show was held at the New
Stanley Hotel. This is a five-star hotel in Nairobi, complete not only with tourists, leather
armchairs and colonial décor, but also with valets and bodyguards—thus acting as a sort
of dissuasion to the participation of the “common man” who would note dare set foot into
the hotel.
42 This  was  a  strategic  choice  by  the  producers. According  to  them,  restricting the
discussion to  intellectual  level  was more  efficient  than popular  speech.43,  in  view of
speeches by political leaders. From this we see the constitution of public personalities
who took on a double status through these shows as they were highly present in the
media and could be invited to a forum (as leaders) and in the public (as ordinary citizens).
This  ambiguity is  well  summarised in the vague definition of  the “civil  society.” For
example, in this ambiguous category is the director of Cradle, a local NGO, who is also a
woman- rights activist having participated in the Bomas constitution reform process, and
is an advocate of the Law Society of Kenya.
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43 A majority of the people in the audience often had prior experience (albeit different) in
speaking  in  public.  They  sometimes  had  responsibilities  or  political  and  social
involvements. Their appearance at this sort of show often follows a precise agenda: the
promotion of a cause, publicity for an organization or party, the search for an audience
and  exposure.  Some  appeared  mainly  in  civic  elections,  an  experience  which  could
improve oratory qualities and help in building networks44
44 The political communication sector in Kenya is thus structured along lines of exclusion of
some  actors,  to  the  benefit  of  “professionals,”  despite  a  lively  discussion  on  direct
democracy and popular participation.
 
The moral and political model projected in the talk-
shows
45 After having seen the structure of the political communication sphere in Kenya, it  is
easier to understand the model of the moral and political order observed in the political
shows on television. This order declines in interaction models between those led and
their leaders, in citizenship and leadership models, and in creating a national ideal.
46 Contrary  to  what  the  violence  at  the  beginning  of  2008  would  make  one  think  and
contrary to some incitation to hate observed in local radio talk-shows on stations such as
Kass FM (Kalenjin), Inooro (Kikuyu) and Radio Lake Victoria (Luo)45, the political debate
on national  stations  reflected and increased a  sort  of  moralization of  public  debate,
according to well-defined values.
47 Media coverage of the campaign was generally equal and attentive to suggestions from
the candidates, to verbal outbursts and fraud attempts. Opinion polls took centre stage,
and human rights defenders were clearly on the scene. Nevertheless, some shows went
further than a simple equitable coverage of the debates by proposing a normative model
of  democratic  negotiation,  citizen  participation  and  national  community  by  taking
tribalism as the first target.
 
The reconstruction of a democratic order, the “rationalisation” of
politics
Pluralist representations: accuracy and balance
48 The first point in this new ideal democracy rests on the order to partisan equilibrium and
to  pluralism,  including  identification.  This  “balance”  and  all  notions  of  “political
accuracy” that go along with it, is socially constructed by the producers (NGOs and/or
journalists)  of  the  shows.  There  were  nine  candidates  in  total,  in  the  presidential
elections. 117 parties were in competition for parliamentary and local council seats. The
Kenya  Broadcasting  Corporation Act  required  the  public  radio  media  to  provide  equal
amounts of coverage to the different political parties in a campaign period.46 There was
therefore no obligation to private audiovisual media to accord equal coverage to all the
parties.47 In the cases studied, the notion of partisan equity remained an issue at the
discretion of the journalists.48
49 As a general rule, this arbitrary judgement was based on opinion polls and collective
representation figures in an election that pitted two equal forces against each other—
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ODM and PNU—with a “third man,” K. Musyoka. In the broadcasts of private stations, the
pubic was ideally composed of an equal number of activists from both ODM and PNU, a
smaller number of ODM-K activists and civil society representatives who were invited on
account of the “partisan neutrality.” Basically, these latter were members of local NGOs
as well as community associations and corporations. In the panels, there were generally
four or five guests, with a PNU, ODM, ODM-K, civil society (human rights and gender
activists), and an expert (consultant or academic) representation.
50 This model was different from that of the Centre for Multiparty Democracy, whose aim
was to support small political parties and advocate for a greater institutionalisation of
parties in Kenya. It comprised 16 party members and sponsored a live and interactive
mobile TV show on KBC, Town Hall. In each region where the show took place, the CMD
invited all candidates in the parliamentary candidates to take part in the panel, including
those from the small political parties.49
51 The  presence  of  civil  society  organisations  allowed  for  a  readjustment  of  balanced
identification, on which the idea of pluralism also rests. In order to perfect the idea of
staging national debates, making the shows credible and due to the predominant issues of
redistribution  and  marginalisation,  the  producers  persisted  in  recreating  a
representation of some form of regional diversity (and thus tribal), along with religious
and  professional  diversity.  This  shows  a  reconstitution  and  celebration  of  a  Kenyan
nation, reinvented and famous for its diversity, and the establishing of equality in access
to speech and political representation. This was symbolized by equal access to the media.
According  to  the  producers,  equitable  identification  was  respected  through  specific
attention to  the profiles  of  the people  invited to  form the audience.  In promotional
speech on these shows, the members of the public were meant to represent the man on
the ground, the common man. They became some type of “major voters” or “delegates”
representing  the  different  groups  composing  the  Kenyan  nation,  no  matter  their
appearance (sex, veil, Maasai attire) or by the cause that they represented (women, Islam,
farmers, matatu touts).
52 In the case of the mobile shows, the value of national representation was even further
brought to the limelight. For the journalists, the show was not simply an opportunity to
discuss  a  subject.  It  was  a  moment  for  consultation  and  integration  with  certain
populations in the national debate. This led to insistence on their part when stating the
rules of the debate, that participants should speak in their capacity as “inhabitants” of
Isiolo, Nyeri, or Embu. It is with this idea in mind that some journalists bypassed the
topics defined by their donors, to avoid restricting the residents of a constituency to
particular themes and to offer them an opportunity to make their demands known at
national level.
 
Adding value to the citizen’s personal responsibility
53 Despite this “community” aspect, it was striking to observe the importance accorded to
the figure or  the scale  of  the individual  in the shows.  Generally  speaking,  the NGOs
involved in electoral education programmes insisted during the campaign period on the
responsibility  of  the  electors  in  choosing  a  representative.50 However,  this  specific
insistence on the individual’s political responsibility, be it at the level of the vote or at the
level  of  taking centre  stage in the talk  shows,  should also be  put  in relation to  the
rejection  of  tribalism.  Taking  the  example  of  the  format  of  the  talk  shows,  the
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instructions given by the presenter of a show held in Narok were very clear, focusing on
the particularity of the show as a performance venue of a re-moralised political order. In
Narok, L. Otieno introduced his debate as follows:
We are here as individuals, not to reduce the Maasai issue to what you hear outside.
You are not obliged to share our point of view. What you have is an identification
card and a voter’s card. Therefore if someone raises an opinion that you do not
agree with, it does not mean that you must believe what he believes.51
54 The idea  was  to  detribalise  the  competition for  power,  to  focus  on rhetoric,  and to
discourage  ethnic  loyalty  in  the  voting  process.  This  was  to  forewarn  about  bitter
reactions after the results and to promote an idea of politics based on a choice considered
as  beneficial  to  the  entire  country  and  also  as  being  more  “rational,”  less  given  to
identification  passions,  with  a  Cartesian  ideal  of  an  individual  enlightened  due  to  a
freedom from ethnic belonging. This idea of rationality has the tendency to associate the
idea of ethnic allegiance to the irrational, while this same step more often revealed the
hope of economic repercussions and thus of a choice that should be carefully considered.
 
Focusing on problems rather than on candidates
55 Parallel to this specific attention to personal political responsibility, the talk shows also
had a rule to reject discussions on people and individuals, such as giving an assessment or
critique of actions or of the personality of a politician.
56 This example leads us to the third characteristic of the model, the ideal of an issue-based
campaign. This terminology in itself comes from political communication experts in the
United States.52 Issue based is opposed to horse-race or game based coverage. In Kenya,
thanks to this principle, the idea still encounters tribalism and detaches the stakes of the
election from ethnic identity, to add value to trans-ethnic issues, on which the debates
focused.
57 The issue-based ideal has important implications on the list of journalistic criticisms by
depreciating direct criticism of a leader or candidate and by modifying the conditions of
confrontation  with  the  leaders.  On  the  other  hand,  although  the  majority  of  the
producers have kept the desire to launch oppositional debate, the idea is not to make the
opposition less dramatic (with statements such as: “After all, we are all Kenyans”; “If your
neighbour has a different opinion it’s not a big deal”), but to seek solutions and points of
agreement, and to have a strong propositional side. The candidates had larges blocks of
time to expose their programmes. On the other hand, some sought to deport from the list
of criticisms from time to time and to bring forward positive aspects of the political
situation. Louis Otieno Live. recorded in Isiolo, for example, was begun by the presenter in
the following words: “I would like us to start with the positive things in Isiolo, of the things that
are going well.”
 
Making politics a science: the role of experts
58 These  talk  shows are  also  a  narration of  a  performance of  political  “normalcy”  and
“rationality” of the country, which corresponds to the expectations of the alternation of
2002 as time for democratic normalcy in Kenya.
59 For this, the experts (cited earlier) played a key role. Some openly sought to change the
rules of the political game to make it more professional, make it a science, make political
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competition a rational and calculable affair of which they would have the key. Hence, for
Isaac Otieno, consultant:
The idea of professional politics only gained ground in 2002. Because in 2002 people
like me began to be employed to only work on politics it became profitable and
professional. Thirdly, working exclusively on politics came to be seen as a scientific
activity. Thus in 2002, we tried it out and realised that it worked very well and that
it led to NARC’s success.53
60 Whereas political representations as a science may have permeated into the electoral
field, they also entered the media through the presence of experts on television. In this
case as well, it is tribalism that was targeted as these experts had a desire to restore
political  competition  on  the  field  of  economic  and  social  expertise,  to  evaluate  the
programmes and actions of the leaders, and to focus the debate on the priorities defined
as a result of scientific expertise.
61 They also  took part  in  a  valorising the recentralisation of  a  choice  of  leader  on his
personal  ability  by  developing modules  of  advice  on communication and in  political
marketing  (even  if  the  facts  of  this  advice  in  political  marketing  obviously  exploits
political potential in redistribution networks, including tribal). The scientific aspect of
politics  is  also  veered  against  the  invisible,  religious  invocation  and  the  various
components of charismatic power (especially in “politics of the stomach,” sorcery, money
etc., and relationships), with the desire to explain and expose how the leaders got to their
positions, to take political competition to the field of science and thus remove the sacred
aura of power. As indicated in the extract of the interview with I. Otieno below, television
is (probably paradoxically) meant to take part in this desacralisation, via strictly followed
rules on the screen and the exposure of candidates to questions from the participants.
There is popular representation in Kenya which sees politics in itself as a dirty and
nasty thing. This is true of the people who want to access power in order to steal
money, people who want power to control, dominate and dictate behaviour. And
when  they  see  us  speaking  here,  they  see  that  politics  is  actually  a  harmless
profession. That politics is scientific! We are speaking here of science in the media,
we use figures, we talk of programmes, we raise questions on how measures are put
in place,  we bring out a political  economy in decision-making in the country,  a
political economy of violence, a political economy of corruption, which is a huge
problem in the country ... And then they see us, they can look at us, watch us on TV
and can therefore say: ‘These are normal people! They are harmless.’54
 
Agitating for social peace through the media
62 It  is  rather  striking  to  see  the  performance  dimension  that  the  NGOs,  experts  and
journalists  project  in  the  talk  shows.  With  these  broadcasts,  one  sees  a  process  of
“civilisation of political exchange” according to the values that have been restored and
resulting from strict regulations on the screen. Beyond a simple balanced coverage of the
campaign, Kenyan journalists have sought to influence the form and depth of electoral
debate, to “moralise” political exchange. This attitude was again found in the attitude of
the media,  including the press,  after the beginning of  the violence,  with a clear and
shared position on the level of coverage of the confrontations and the position to take
concerning suspicions of fraud.55 The political communication sphere in Kenya is thus
additionally structured around these norms and the “moral mission” of the media.
63 Journalists and NGOs also made a bet on the “ritual of boxed reversal,” as described by
James Scott.56 This means that in a dynamic similar to that of celebrations or fairy tales
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that show a reversal of power, these talk shows as the stage for democracy will play a
cathartic role, and have an effect in the “real” world of politics by defusing political anger
and recourse to violence: the expression of demands and the playing the role of citizen
allowed for an absorption of frustration and release of pressure, which J. Scott refers to as
“the  valve  theory.”  This  theory  must  be  considered  with  precaution  and  not  be
systematised,  as  this  sort  of  ritual  can  represent  a  “preparation”  rather  than  an
“alternative” to the reversal.57
64 Another aspect of the performance project is that of an equalisation of the participants,
characteristic of the myth of a communication society, which draws from the idea of a
model of an egalitarian society network.58 The inequalities of the facts presented in the
Kenyan society are supposed to disappear in the model of debate staged in the talk shows,
even if they resurface as inequalities in access to speech in the shows and in equalities in
oral capacities etc. Once again in the terminology of James Scott, the “public manuscript”
of the show would be equality, and the “hidden manuscript” would be inequalities. He
illustrates this by giving the example of an academic seminar, an example that can be
very well applied to televised talk shows:
The public manuscript desires that all those around the table be endowed with the
same power, and this is what is encouraged in the architectural form of this kind of
meeting. However (…) the distribution of power has absolutely nothing to do with
equality; despite this, it is impossible to bring this out explicitly and directly during
the seminar.59
65 This reinvention of social conditions in the national debate, the detachment from the
ground  as  earlier  expressed,  is  also  due  to  this  performance  characteristic  and  the
projection of an idealised political arena.
 
The variables of the set
Self-presentation and imaginary citizenship in public intervention
66 After having analysed what the values that the producers of the shows wanted to stage
were, it is time to put a halt to this type of debate projected on television and especially
on the interventions of the “citizens.” What are their characteristics? To what extent are
they appropriate to the model? What can be said and what is unspeakable on television?
67 Several factors are taken into account in the analysis of these interventions. First, the
social homogeneity that has earlier been described, followed by the control imposed on
citizens’ speech by the producers of the shows.
68 In the case of Agenda Kenya, the contributions were initially oriented by distributing two
pages summarising the major issues of the subject to be discussed. This happened an hour
before the broadcast. Then the presenter lengthily “briefed” the audience on the topic,
suggesting to them questions and issues to raise. After this, the members of the audience
had to write two questions on another piece of paper. An “editorial committee” chose
four of these (out of a total of 200, as the show had about 100 people in the audience, at
each screening). Knowing that the questions were selected, some people in the audience
had a tendency to take up the presenter’s suggestions. These four questions were used to
launch the debate, especially after commercial breaks. Out of these four questions, an
average  of  five  were  posed  by  people  raising  their  hand  and  being  chosen  by  the
presenter. In the different sessions that were observed, the questions from the public
precisely conformed to topic stated.
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69 Mobile shows, especially Louis Otieno Live. were different. Each time, the debate centred on
a preoccupation common to all the shows: the redistribution of resources. This was the
case even where the key questions varied: “Inclusion and Nationhood”; “Leadership and
Development” etc. To understand this phenomenon, several factors must be taken into
account: first,  as earlier seen, the question of the topic to be covered was a result of
negotiations between the donor (who preferred to have other more transversal themes
such as the youth and women) and the editorial team. The former wanted to localise the
debate, making it relevant to issues on, the ground to the point where the moderator
placed specific emphasis on the notion of community (Kamba, Maasai etc.) This was in
order to place the show in the role of political intermediary between the centre and the
periphery  or  grassroots,  which  were  strongly  integrated  in  the  discussions  of  the
journalists within the general elections process. It amounted to justifying political utility
with a political (placing the media at the centre of Kenyan political space) commercial
aim.
70 In this show, the contributions of the “citizens” were homogenous. They first put value
on the land (Kambaland is  a place of  “milk and honey,” Maasai  Mara is  “one of  the
wonders of the world,” “we are sitting on gold, and we do not know it,” etc.) and at the
same time, they also spoke about the poverty of the area (no roads, dependence on food
handouts, no education, etc.). Another notable point is the importance of the discussions
of “self-mobilisation,” with injunctions such as “we must mobilise ourselves [to emerge
from poverty], no one will do it for us,” etc. However, the most poignant characteristic
was the often-brutal criticism of local leaders who did not ensure redistribution. This
criticism and focusing of debate on the local challenges partly explains the direction of
the debate by the presenter, as well as on electoral deadlines and the huge presence of
politicians among the audience. These latter used this as an opportunity to put forth their
legitimacy  as  leaders,  and  to  campaign.60 This  factor  was  a  hijacking  of  the
recommendation for an issue-based campaign.
71 In  all  the  shows,  the  leaders  were  actually  at  the  centre  of  reproach—corruption,
alienation  from  the  grassroots,  non-consideration  of  problems  of  poverty  and
underdevelopment, with a particular focus on issues of responsibility to citizens, whom
they were supposed to serve. On this point, the use of “we” or of “me” opposed to “you”
or “them” is enough of an indication and reinforcement of the idea of a homogenous
community of voters. In Agenda Kenya, a contributor stated:
You politicians have created this culture [of vote-buying]. We are going to have a
politician who will come to give us money because it is a culture that you have
created. No politician must give me money!61
72 Generally, these shows displayed a strong scepticism, or anger directed at those elected
and the political élite.  It  was striking to note that in this edition of Agenda Kenya on
financing  political  parties,  the  applause  was  mainly  for  those  who  were  neutral:  a
university don presented as a governance and public policy consultant, and a former vice-
chairman of the ECK, who had both proclaimed their partisan neutrality at the beginning
of the show. These two people took highly critical positions concerning the use of money
during the campaign.
73 The text messages sent during Agenda Kenya and in Louis Otieno Live… were homogenised
and classified into two categories: “yes” and “no,” in response to a question asked at the
beginning  of  the  broadcast,62 therefore  leaving  out  the  accompanying  comments.
However, those sent to the radio broadcast Crossfire confirmed the use of this type of
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channel to express disillusion or anger towards the political élite, in language that was
often more crude and direct than that on live discussions on the screen. Below are a few
examples taken from Crossfire, on 9 December 2007.63
We have thieves and corrupt people across the political divide, we are waiting for
all of them to die, and leave us to ourselves
Corruption is corruption—let people like Maanzo [chairman of ODM-K] not speak of
corruption because he received bribes and a vehicle in order to make Hon Raila
group separate from his party ODM-K
Kenyans are  overtaxed to  pay the same MPs who have stolen billions  and hide
abroad
I read the list on the Stupidity Index every Saturday in the Nation. I think that some
of these parties belong to this group, especially PNU in collaborating with all the
Mois, Biwotts and Pattnis64 of the world. It speaks volumes that ODM is part of this
absurdity with the likes of Moi in its ranks (…)
74 In Louis Otieno Live…, self-introductions centred on the affirmation of one’s right to speak
“as  a  citizen,”  “as  a  Kenyan,”  and  the  value  of  his  representative role,  be  it  gender,
generation, religion or ethnic community or even party: “I want to speak for the women of
this country/district,” “as a student…,” “I’m a member of the League of Kenyan women voters,” “
as a supporter of PNU,” etc. Although this phenomenon was quite visible in Agenda Kenya,
the majority of the participants only gave their last and first name, or went directly to the
question, which correspond to the model of the detribalised and individualised image of
the voter. In the issues of Agenda Kenya watched, ethnic references in self-introductions
were absent, even though belonging to an area (designated in non-ethnic forms like “the
people  of  Molo,”  “someone  from Garissa”)  is  valorised in  an idea  of  authenticity  of  the
experience shared by the contributor.
75 The situation is different in Louis Otieno Live on the road. Whereas the aim of these shows is
to put an end to tribalism, the references to ethnic affiliation were not removed. They
came through the airwaves in language couched in several terms:
76 Celebration  of  cultural  diversity:  this  was  evident  by  encouraging  traditional  dress,
invitations to say a few words in the vernacular, a discussion on celebration of cultural
peculiarities  and  a  reconstructed  national  identity  mosaic,  L.  Otieno’s  shedding  of  a
formal suit in favour of the tunic worn by Muslims in the eastern parts of Kenya etc.
Ethnic language in this instance detaches itself from political stakes.
77 Announcing  one’s  ethnic  orientation:  this  was  used  by  journalists  and participants  as  a
guarantee of belonging to an area, seen as a source of expertise and legitimacy to speak.
Depicting the common man by insisting on his belonging to an ethnic community shows
the anchoring of the broadcast to “the average citizen,” despite the elevated social profile
of the participants. In the different shows, the presenters encouraged witness reports,
experience on the ground, and gave recordings from the field. In Louis Otieno Live on the
road, there was a clear encouragement to appear as a Kamba or Maasai block in the
national  media.  Contributions  by  the  public  also  followed  this  trend.  However,  it  is
important to specify that self-introduction as a member of an ethnic community always
operated as “expertise from daily life,”65 of identification of the problems or assets of the
land and of their representation on a national scale. Ethnic loyalty is strongly devalued.
78 Self-introduction: concerning the language used to indicate ethnicity, it is worth noting the
names of ethnic groups are used to identify oneself and not the Other. This means that in
a broadcast done in Kitui, the word “Kamba” or “Ukambani” will feature prominently,
together with expressions like “the people of Kitui,” “our community,” “this community,” “the
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people of this region,” “we.” Nevertheless, the designation of the Other systematically goes
through roundabout means: “People from other regions,” “so-called mainstream communities,”
“other  communities,”  “some ethnic  groups,”  “the right  ethnic  group” (in describing ethnic
groups  that  enjoy  the  fruits  of  redistribution),  “neglected  communities,”  “pastoral
communities,” “minorities.” The identification of the Other by the name of its ethnic group
therefore remains very rare on television and leads to a list of unspeakable terms on
television, without this necessarily being linked to the rules stated at the beginning of the
show.
 
The unspeakable and variations in identity
79 Contributions  of  members  of  the  public  are  not  always  appropriate  to  the  expected
model. The most usual example of going beyond the boundaries of the unspeakable is
found  in  what  journalists  call  the  “personalisation  of  the  debate.”  However,  this
blameworthy personalisation must also operate within a certain format. It was notable
that during the broadcast of Louis Otieno Live.in Narok, attacks against Wole Ntimama
(harsh and clearly directed against him through qualifications such as “the leadership of
Parliament  in  Narok  North”)  were  not  cut  short  by  the  journalist,  despite  the  strong
instruction to base the debate on issues and not on personalities according to the model.
Nevertheless, the journalist very quickly stopped a nominative contribution:
If Mzee Ntimama can do nothing to influence the government, I would like to know
what he is doing there. Do not misunderstand us—it is only that Mzee Ntimama has
been a Minister of State for a long time. He claims to have an influence on cabinet
decisions now, but not on,  those that concern the development of  Narok!  He is
simply tired, he must retire to his home!
80 The  attention  on  these  boundaries  of  the  speakable  and  the  confrontation  between
identity  and  public  language  adopted  within  the  talk  show  on  one  hand,  and  the
discussions held in interviews on the other, were particularly fruitful. They show that
there is no incompatibility between language or the adherence to an individualisation
model and the technicality of politics promoted by talk shows and that of ethnic loyalty,
personalisation  of  political  demands  or  culturalism.  The  talk  shows  model  and  the
discussion surrounding them tend to create a dichotomy or an opposition between an
ethnic dimension and an individualised dimension of  subjectivity,  or even between a
tribal dimension and a political issues dimension.
81 In  reality,  these  dimensions  were  revealed  to  cohabit  among  some  participants
interviewed.  There  were  shows  where  identifying  with  an  ethnic  group  was  not
discouraged as the discussions created a state of political “loyalty” in the name of ethnic
group, associating political and ethnic belonging and revealing the unspeakable. The two
were combined and this is what was observed through the interviews. Among the most
regular  participants  in  these  shows,  some did  not  hide  the  “tribal”  reasons  of  their
political affiliation, which was “unspeakable” in a talk show. The extract of an interview
with one such participant is given below (he was interviewed at his fourth appearance
since the beginning of the campaign period).
In some aspects, tribal affiliations also veered me towards PNU. This is a fact and I
won’t lie to you about it…
Because you would be better with other Kikuyu?
Because of the political affiliation. and the politico-tribal affiliation. I am not saying
that it is 80% of what pushed me to PNU. It is perhaps 10%, 10% in total. Because I
have never been for the tribal factor as it has never helped me.
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But you accept that it has an influence…
Yes, it makes a difference. It has made a difference. Because for me, being from
Central Province, going to ODM would not help me.66
82 Beyond this false dichotomy between a “rationalised” and televised citizenship and an
ethnicized one, party affiliation also had the tendency to be set in the talk shows due to
the means of recruiting members of the audience. The life tales of the participants show
elements of complex political loyalties, constantly shifting and winding, within which lies
ethnic,  generational,  ideological and gender aspects The analysis of talk-shows in the
electoral campaign in Kenya shows how much the producers of these shows, journalists,
NGOs and experts, wanted to see the shows as a moralisation tool for political life in
Kenya and to fight against tribalism. The producers therefore fronted an idealised debate,
incarnated  by  the  “professionalized”  middle-classes,  in  a  configuration  that  masked
inequalities, giving an impression of detachment from the ground and a framework of
public speech. The voluntarism seen was to anchor the campaign thematically and to
detach  the  voting  process  from  ethnic  loyalties  but  it  collided  with  the  regional
homogeneity of the results. However, the Kenyan media in general and the talk-shows in
particular  participated in  spreading demands  for  transparency from political  leaders
(associated to their direct presence on television before the public), demands for citizens
to speak out and a notion of political balance, as seen in the national television stations in
marginalised areas and by the partisan and identification equilibrium recreated in the
public.
83 This analysis provides for a better understanding of the attitude of the media during the
crisis that followed the voting process. The journalists indeed adopted a common position
in calling for peace and choosing not to take sides on the question of election fraud, or
even to lead an investigation on the subject. This amounted censoring some information
on the violence, due to threats by the government on freedom of expression but also for
fear of being part of the conflagration and fixation on identification rancour.
84 Kenyan journalists acted prudently faced with the urgency for a return to calm and under
pressure from the State. On 30 December, the government went so far as to place a ban,
on audiovisual media giving live broadcasts. The journalists rejected this ban. Kiss FM
continued to emit live news, and the Media Council,  under W. Waruru expressed the
profession’s  collective refusal  to bend to this  ban.  However,  apart  from Kiss  FM,  this
measure ended up being applied to some extent.67 Despite having been a performing
model  of  detribalised  debate,  talk-shows  disappeared  from  television  screens.  On
29 January,  KTN  and  the  Media  Institute,  an  organisation  headed  by  David  Makali,
deposed a complaint against this ban, which was eventually lifted on 4 February.
85 The attitude of the press during the crisis was linked to this interdiction and was also in
continuity  with the  desire  to  battle  against  ethnic  divisions.  This  editorial  choice  of
responsibility on the part of Kenyan journalists corresponds to the list of criticisms and
control of the media by the government, also translated into a mutation of the code of
ethics that reflected and encouraged talk-shows in Kenya today.
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NOTES
1. NTV is owned by Nation Media Group, whose majority owner is the AgaKhan while KTN
of The Standard Group is three-thirds owned by Daniel arap Moi’s family.
2. The figures on the number of Kenyans who own a television set varies according to the
various sources as no nationwide survey has benn carried out on this subject. However, in
order to give an idea of the size, it is useful to indicate that it oscillates between 17% and
32%. One must take into account the fact that even if many Kenyans do not own a set,
they  watch  TV in  public  places,  particularly  in  bars.  See  Africa  Media  Development
Initiative,  BBC  for  figures:  http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMDI/
kenya/amdi_kenya6_television.pdf [archive].
3. Counted and presented as graphic opinion polls at the end of each programme.
4. ‘The Elusive Live Debate.’ The Standard, 11 December 2007.
5. According to the Washington Post, the campaign expenses of the two main parties varied
between 6 to 10 million US dollars. See Stephanie McCrummen, ‘Kenya Tests New Style of
Politicking.’ Washington Post, 22 December 2007. In comparison, in France, the campaign of
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the Socialist Party (PS) or the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in 2007 cost each of
the  two  parties  about  20  million  euros.  Nevertheless,  there  is  is  some  vagueness
concerning the fundng of political parties and camapigns in Kenya, and some of the funds
are personally raised by the candidates, bypassing their political party. For more on this,
see  the  inquiry  by  Coalition  for  Accountable  Political  Financing,  http://capf.or.ke/
default.asp [not available. Archive].
6. This was intially a failure as the first show was presented by Rose Kimotho, the owner
of Radio Kameme, suspected to be a close ally of M. Kibaki and “pro-banana.” After this,
the producers decided to leave the presentation of the Big Debate to L.  Otieno and J.
Gichuru.
7. P. Bourdieu, 1984.
8. For an analysis of these dynamics in the French context, see J. Gerstlé, 2004, p. 138.
9. N. Guilhot, 2004.
10. Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, 2002.
11. Only two examples will be given here. However, it should be noted that the Centre for
Multiparty Democracy (CMD) also sponsored broadcasts on the state- owned station, KBC
and that the Republican Institute sought to sponsor programmes in partnership with the
Media Owners Association. The former is part of National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), and its office is headed by John McCain, Republican presidential candidate in the
USA.
12. To the point  that  some media have refused sponsorship offers,  to the benefit  of
others.
13. In 2006, the Nation Media Group’s annual turnover had increased by 13% as compared
to  the  previous  year  and  attained  Ksh  6.3 billion.  The  pre-tax  profit  reached
Ksh 1.2 billion.  See  http://www.nationmedia.com/corporate/images/
Nation_Annual_Report.pdf [not available].
14. A TV station claiming to be ‘100% Kenyan.’ K24, was launched this year.
15. The dependence choices are further contrasted: journalists of the radio programme
Crossfire preferred to be sponsored by the mobile telephone company Celtel than by an
NGO, considering that the former allowed them editorial autonomy.
16. The last edition of Louis Otieno Live on the Road was not sponsored by Media Focus.
17. This sponsorship was seen by some journalists as an interference in a show that was
popular  before  the  arrival  of  sponsors  within  a  team that  had been created several
months earlier. This explains the difference with Agenda Kenya, which had not held this
type of debate since the editorial work was more separated between the NGO and the
station. The fact that Media Focus is an NGO of the North could have added to the malaise
by incorporating dependence relationships. The relationship between Medeva and NTV
was stated as a ‘businness’ one rather than a ‘development’ one.
18. Interview with a journalist from Citizen TV, Nairobi, 24 December 2007.
19. This example also suggests the influence of political pressure or self-censorship in the
format of the talk-shows.
20. Interview with Hannington Gaya, 19 December 2007.
21. For more on the issues of spread and reappropriation of French and Anglo- Saxon
models of journalism in Africa, see the works of B. Rambaud (forthcoming).
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22. This  was  not  always  true.  Interview  with  L.  Kaikai,  Nairobi,  19  December  2007,
interview with L. Otieno, Nairobi, 24 December 2007.
23. This statement of normalcy, of Kenya as a ‘model’ or ‘exception’ on the continent, has
been highly present in the media since 2002. It was again displayed during the January
2008 crisis, in the expressions of surprise incomprehension shown by the journalists. For
an analysis of media coverage of the crisis, see the article by B. Rambaud in this issue.
24. The adaptation of these models to the Kenyan context and their eventual modification
by the protagonists demands a comparative study treated with the American or British
shows which inspired them. According to the journalists interviewed, the modifications
are essentially technical and are independent of their wish (for example the presidential
debate which did not happen and would have had to be transformed into individualised
auditions of  K.  Musoyka and R.  Odinga).  It  will  be rather interesing to see if  such a
problem of ethnic representation exists in the public arena in Great Britain and in the
United States.
25. “Extroversion consists of embracing foreign cultural elements by submitting them to local
objectives” (J.-F. Bayart, 1997, p. 80).
26. This phenomenon is also present in francophone Africa and is described by Hugeux in
his book. The profile of the consultants and the conditions in which they are employed by
African leaders seem to be different in anglophone Africa. See Vincent Hugeux (2007), for
a comparison.
27. Bill Clinton’s campaign manager in 1996, he resigned two months before the election
after  a  scandal  involving a  prostitute.  Since then,  he has been an editorial  writer,  a
consultant  and often appears  in talk-shows in the US.  During the Kenyan campaign,
Morris was expelled for the country on the grounds that he did not have a work permit,
but he continued to work for ODM from the States (Nairobi Star, 8 December 2007). Raila
Odinga and Morris maintained that they did not have a commercial arrangement and that
the American had offered his services for free.
28. Courage is a marketer who heads an enterprise called Africa Practice. It encourages
the IDE and political  communication of  international  organisations in Africa.  He also
worked for the campaign of the new Nigerian president, Umaru Yar’Adua.
29. http://www.taifatekelezi.com [not available. Archive].
30. To  give  an  idea  of  the  rates  in  this  profession,  a  consultant  confirmed that  he
demands  Ksh 100,000  (1,000 euros)  for  communication  advice  and  developing
parlaimentary campaign messages in Nairobi and about Ksh 8,000 (80 euros) for an advice
session with a civic election candidate.
31. It should be specified that a recourse to vote-buying had greatly developed. According
to the Coalition for Accountable Political Financing, a regrouping of NGOs financed by the
USAID. An average of Ksh 5 million was distributed to constituencies during the party
nominations held in 2007. The NGO comprises Transparency International and the Center
for  Multiparty Democracy  among  others.  The  survey  also  revealed  that  38%  of  the
candidates’ campaign budget was set aside for vote-buying (http://capf.or.ke/default.asp
[Not available. Archive]).
32. Some actors did not remain at SMS level: Safaricom offered an information service in
real time, especially during the broadcast of the results (Ksh 7 per SMS), just like the
Nation Media Group did.
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33. Interview with a journalist from The Standard, Nairobi, 10 December 2007.
34. See  Joe  Kadhi,  ‘How  the  referendum  was  covered.’  11  February  2007,  http://
mediawatchman.blogspot.com [Archive].
35. For an in-depth anaylsis on the inequalities of coverage between the candidates on
the different stations, refer to the study carried out by Strategic Africa for the UNDP,
available on www.strategicafrica.com.
36. “Kibaki’s Muthaiga club.’ New Vision, 22 December 2007.
37. Interview with a PNU activist, participant in Louis Otieno Live, Nairobi, 24 December
2007.
38. According to the PNU activist, these representatives received neither reimbursements
for costs incurred or an allowance for their task, as would have been the case in local
mobilisation operations or to attend a meeting.
39. In the talk-shows viewed in Nairobi, the members of the public received an allowance
or per diem varying from Ksh 100 to 1,000, depending on the distance travelled (some
came from provinces very far from Nairobi) and had to spend the night there.
40. These figures came from questionnaires distributed by this researcher to the audience
of talk-shows.
41. For an analysis of the importance of this figure in the myth of a coomunicatiion
society, see E. Neveu, 2006, p. 52–55.
42. Interview with L. Kaikai, Nairobi, 19 December 2007.
43. This  was  especially  so  on  television.  A  strong  division  in  roles  is  clear  in  the
journalists’ discussions. Radio is perceived as the media for the masses and television for
the élite,  who, according to L. Kaikai,  correspond to the ‘second level of the exercice
power.’  For him,  television is  an opportunity to place leaders face-to-face with their
equals, where they would be in a position to challenge the intellectuals. This choice also
works for the targeted public: television being perceived by these journalists as an élite
media, they prefer to stage élites.
44. In response to the question: “What kind of  value can the show bring to you?” in the
questionnaire distributed to participants in the talk-shows viewed, some people answers
were along the lines of “Boost my political ambitions” or “Mature my political status,” etc.
45. IRIN, ‘Kenya: spreading the word of hate.’ 22 January 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/
Report.aspx?ReportId=76346. [Not available. Archive]. These differences can be, among
others,  due  to  the  aims  of  the  different  radio  station  owners,  often  allied  to  some
politicians,  or  a  result  of  the  profile  of  the  talk-show  presenters,  but  it  reveals  a
systematic planning of violence by the directors of the radio station. See Jamal Abdi and
James  Dean,  ‘The  Kenyan 2007  elections  and their  aftermath:  the  role  of  media  and
communication.’ BBC World Service Trust, March 2008, p. 9 et 10.
46. “To maintain a fair balance at all levels of time allocation on air between the different points of
view.  Allocation of  air  time on free blocks was done in consultation with the ECK during the
campaign period preceding presidential, parliamentary or local elections. This allowed the political
parties  participating  in  the  elections,  to  present  their  policies.”  http://www.kenyalaw.org/
kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php [Not available. Archive].
47. This does not mean that partisan equity was respected on KBC: even if attention to the
small candidates was greater on private stations, media coverage was unbalanced as it
was highly skewed towards the outgoing president.
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48. And also a function of the political pressure that they were subjected to.
49. Interview with Omweri Angima, CMD, Nairobi, 18 December 2007.
50. The ECK funded the deployment of huge posters in Nairobi with messages such as “do
not complain about corruption if  you ae not gong to vote,” or even “do not complain about
unemployment,” etc.
51. Luis Otieno Live…, Narok, December 2007.
52. J. Gerstlé, 2004, pp. 132–136.
53. Interview with avec Isaac Otieno, consultant, Nairobi, 14 December 2007.
54. Interview with I. Otieno, op. cit.
55. See the analysis of B. Rambaud in this volume for more on this point.
56. J.C.  Scott,  2006,  ‘Infra-politique des groupes subalternes,’  Vacarme no. 36.  https://
doi.org/10.3917/vaca.036.0025.
57. For a study of the effects of regular participation in talk-shows on individual careers
and entry into politics, see F. Brisset-Foucault (2005), pp. 211–232.
58. E. Neveu, 2006.
59. Interview with J.C. Scott, ‘Dans le dos du pouvoir.’ Vacarme, no. 42, Winter 2008, p. 9.
https://doi.org/10.3917/vaca.042.0004.
60. This was strikingly so in Narok, where the show turned into appraisal of William ole
Ntimama’s mandate.
61. Agenda Kenya, ‘Political financing,’ December 2007.
62. For example: ‘Should political parties disclose the source of the fundings?’ (Agenda
Kenya,  ‘Political  Financing,’  December  2007)  or  ‘Are  elected  leaders  responsible  for
development?’ (Louis Otieno Live… ‘Leadership and Development,’ Kitui, December 2007).
63. According to the producer of the show, several hundred SMS were received at each
edition. At the end of the show, these were printed out and given to the guest speakers,
who each chose two or  three to  air.  In the shows viewed,  an average of  seven text
messages were read. Those cited here were not necessarily aired. They are reproduced
here verbatim. “We have thieves n corrupt people acrose the political divide, we are waiting 4 all
of them 2 die, we are helpless”; “Corruption is coruption let people like Maanzo not talk about
corruption because him he was bribed in order and given a vehicle in order to frustrate Hon Raila
group from his party ODM-K”; “Kenyans are being overtaxed to pay the same MPs who stole
billions & are keeping abroad”; “I read the stupidity indew column every sat[urday] in the nation. I
think this parties belong to this group n particularly PNU with collaboration the mois biwotts
patnis of this world. It speaks wolumes that ODM is party 2 this nonsense with mois remnants in its
ranks (…).”
64. The former president Daniel arap Moi, Nicholas Biwott, or the “Total Man,” one of the
main  figures  in  political  repression  under  Moi’s  regime,  Kamlesh  Pattni,  one  of  the
protagonists of the Goldenberg scandal of the 1990s.
65. S. Livingstone, 1994.
66. Interview with a PNU activist, member of the audience in Louis Otieno Live, Nairobi, 24
December 2007.
67. An exemption was made for the opening of the Parliamentary Session on 15 January.
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